Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'The Rationalists'
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12 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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11978
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Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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6882
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Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
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6886
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Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
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6885
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Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
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6884
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Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
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6883
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Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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5449
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Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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11979
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It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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16994
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Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
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11974
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Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
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11975
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If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
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11977
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Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
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