Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Metaphysics' and 'Mere Possibilities'
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19 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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12611
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Necessity makes alternatives impossible [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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16466
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Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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17852
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A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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15779
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Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
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15769
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Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
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14544
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Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances [Aristotle]
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15774
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We recognise potentiality from actuality [Aristotle]
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15777
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A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing [Aristotle]
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15778
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Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them [Aristotle]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
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16438
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Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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16436
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Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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12612
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Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities [Aristotle]
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15108
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Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths [Aristotle, by Koslicki]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
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16433
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Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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16437
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Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
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16444
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Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
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16445
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I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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16454
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Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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16450
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Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
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