Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Varieties of Necessity', 'Counterparts and Identity' and 'Analyzing Modality'
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15 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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9216
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Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
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11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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16409
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Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
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16411
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If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
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16412
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If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
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11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
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