Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Letters to a German Princess', 'Material Beings' and 'A Powers Theory of Modality'
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13 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
14377
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Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14376
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States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
14379
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Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14372
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Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572
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Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
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12466
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All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
14371
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We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12465
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Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12464
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If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
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12469
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Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579
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Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590
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A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
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17591
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Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
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