Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Possibility', 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism' and 'Letter to Herodotus'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
13394
|
Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5479
|
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
13391
|
Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien]
|
13374
|
To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
5483
|
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
5447
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
5476
|
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
5478
|
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
14039
|
Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
5482
|
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien]
|
13390
|
Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien]
|