Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Analyzing Modality', 'works' and 'Conditionals (Stanf)'
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24 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
14281
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A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
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14284
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Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14270
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Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
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14269
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Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14275
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Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
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14274
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Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
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14276
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The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
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14290
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Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14271
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Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
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14272
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I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14282
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On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14278
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Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
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14287
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Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
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