Combining Texts
Ideas for
'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Naming and Necessity lectures'
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33 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11880
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Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9442
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The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
4797
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Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
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17037
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Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
23495
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The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
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4728
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Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
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16990
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A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
9386
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The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
4960
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"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
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4966
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Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
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2408
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Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
23487
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What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
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13967
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Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
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13970
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Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
23470
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Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
23507
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Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
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23469
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An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
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16992
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Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11027
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To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
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23465
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The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
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16993
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If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
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16998
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Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
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17001
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A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
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4952
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Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
7761
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Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
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7693
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Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
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5821
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Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
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14068
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If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
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10436
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A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
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4953
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We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
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4961
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It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12869
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Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
16986
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That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
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