Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Material Beings', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'Getting Causes from Powers'

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14 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14579 Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
14580 Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14552 Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
14578 Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14549 Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
17572 Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
17590 A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
17591 Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]