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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'Conditionals (Stanf)'

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36 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
14281 A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
14284 Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14270 Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
14269 Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14275 Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
14274 Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
14276 The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
14290 Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14271 Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
14272 I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14282 On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14278 Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
14287 Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]