Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'The Case for Contextualism' and 'The Logic of What Might Have Been'
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16 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680
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Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690
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In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
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14677
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Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
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14679
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Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
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14688
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Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
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14685
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Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681
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Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676
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Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689
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Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674
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Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
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14682
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Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
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14687
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Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683
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Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672
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Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
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14675
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Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673
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You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
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