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2 ideas
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too. |
| 21958 | Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW] |
| Full Idea: Appearances in general are nothing outside our representations, which is just what we mean by transcendental ideality. | |
| From: A.W. Moore (The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics [2012], B535/A507) |