display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
| 5991 | For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle | |
| A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap. |
| 547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The ability to teach is a distinguishing mark between the knowledgeable and the ignorant man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981b04) |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The causal theory of beliefs seems condemned to treat all beliefs as true, which is absurd, …and we do not want to say that tomorrow's rain 'causes' today's belief that it will rain tomorrow. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at Fodor. A false belief might be caused by reality if one had one's internal wires crossed, and a belief about the future might be caused by events happening now. This theory is not dead. |
| 544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a14) |
| 546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The skilled know the cause, whereas the experienced do not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a29) |
| 10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a33) | |
| A reaction: This resembles the legal notion of 'mens rea', the conscious intention to commit the deed. |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the 'I' in 'I think' no more serves to pick out a certain object than does the 'it' in 'it is raining'. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice example to remind us that not all English pronouns have genuine reference. You could reply that 'it' does refer, to the weather; or that you can switch to 'you think', but not to 'they/we are raining'. |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting. |