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Ideas for 'works', 'Letters to Antoine Arnauld' and 'fragments/reports'

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3 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive [Aristotle, by Code]
     Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that in general we have knowledge or understanding when we grasp causes, and he distinguishes three fundamental types of knowledge - theoretical, practical and productive.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Alan D. Code - Aristotle
     A reaction: Productive knowledge we tend to label as 'knowing how'. The centrality of causes for knowledge would get Aristotle nowadays labelled as a 'naturalist'. It is hard to disagree with his three types, though they may overlap.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I am assured that as long as I think, I am myself. For I cannot think that I do not exist, nor exist so that I be not myself.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05.13)
     A reaction: Elsewhere he qualifies the Cogito, but here he seems to straighforwardly endorse it.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is not enough for understanding the nature of myself, that I feel myself to be a thinking substance, one would have to form a distinct idea of what distinguishes me from all other possible minds; but of that I have only a confused experience.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14)
     A reaction: Not a criticism I have encountered before. Does he mean that I might be two minds, or might be a multitude of minds? It seems to be Hume's problem, that you are aware of experiences, but not of the substance that unites them.