display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
547 | The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The ability to teach is a distinguishing mark between the knowledgeable and the ignorant man. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981b04) |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
10950 | Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a33) | |
A reaction: This resembles the legal notion of 'mens rea', the conscious intention to commit the deed. |
546 | It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The skilled know the cause, whereas the experienced do not. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a29) |
544 | Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a14) |