display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: There is no agreed way of counting beliefs. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |
| 23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I do not grant to the metaphysicians that the 'I' is what thinks: on the contrary I take the I itself as a construction thinking, of the same rank as 'material',' thing', 'substance', 'purpose', 'number': therefore only as a regulative fiction. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 35[35]) | |
| A reaction: Ah. I have always defended the Self, the thing that is in charge when the mind is directed to something. I suddenly see that this is compatible with the Self not being the thinker! It is just the willer, and the controller of the searchlight. Self = will? |
| 23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Appearance as I understand it is the actual and single reality of things - that which first merits all existing predicates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 40[53]) | |
| A reaction: This is the view espoused by John Stuart Mill (a fact which would shock Nietzsche!). Elsewhere he laughs at the concept of the thing-in-itself as a fiction. |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Berkeley seems to have believed that tables and chairs are logically homogeneous with afterimages. I assume that he was wrong to believe this. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch.16) |