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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason' and 'Metaphysics'

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6 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The ability to teach is a distinguishing mark between the knowledgeable and the ignorant man.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981b04)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1032a33)
     A reaction: This resembles the legal notion of 'mens rea', the conscious intention to commit the deed.
It takes skill to know causes, not experience [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The skilled know the cause, whereas the experienced do not.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a29)
Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0981a14)
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: To be object for a subject and to be representation is to be one and the same thing. All representations are objects for a subject, all objects for a subject are representations.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §16 p.41-2), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is pure idealism in early Schopenhauer, derived from Kant. Are being 'an object for a subject' and being an object 'in itself' two different things? Compare Idea 21914, written later. I think Nietzsche's 'perspective' representations helps here.