display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We defend a version of direct realism, saying that justification must be partly a function of perceptual states themselves, and not just a function of our beliefs about perceptual states. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3) | |
A reaction: Judgement suggests that perceptual states give good justification about primary qualities (like mass or shape), but not of secondary qualities (like smell or colour). Perceptions can be downright misleading. |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Phenomenalism offered the prospect of explaining perceptual knowledge within a framework that recognised only conclusive reasons; once it is acknowledged that at least induction uses nonconclusive reasons, it is no longer needed. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.3.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that that is the only motivation for phenomenalism, which seemed to be attempting to get as close to 'reality' as intellectual honesty would allow. I certainly favour the modern relaxed attitude to knowledge, which needn't be 'conclusive'. |