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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mirror Mirror - Is That All?' and 'Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas'

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3 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
     Full Idea: In contrast with standard notions of knowledge, the concept of understanding emphasizes the element of practical engagement from the outset.
     From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II)
     A reaction: This could be the very interesting germ of a huge revolution in our approach to epistemology, which I find rather appealing. Plato's desire that knowledge should have 'logos' seems to me in the same area. It sounds rather internalist, which is good.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
     Full Idea: Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how.
     From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II)
     A reaction: This thought could rather rapidly revive the discredited notion of knowing-how. I think it might slot into an account of the mind in terms of levels, so that my internalist view of knowledge emerges at higher levels, built on more basic responses.