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3 ideas
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
Full Idea: 'Knowledge' is not a precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', and so a very precise definition should not be sought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.13) | |
A reaction: This announcement comes as a relief, after endless attempts (mainly by American academics) to give watertight, carefully worded definitions. It seems to me undeniable that what we will accept as knowledge is partly a matter of social negotiation. |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
Full Idea: A belief or judgement relates a mind to several things other than itself. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: Presumably we must say that if I believe that (say) 'x exists', this is relating x to the universal 'exists'. If so, Russell's point becomes a bit of a tautology. We believe propositions, which are combinations of concepts, so are multiple. |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
Full Idea: We find a belief in an independent external world ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an 'instinctive' belief. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
A reaction: Somewhere Hume calls this a 'natural belief', and it is fairly central to his idea that most of our beliefs are built up fairly mechanically by associations. I am tempted to ask whether such things even count as beliefs, if they are so uncritical. |