5801
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A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
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Full Idea:
A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played.
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From:
Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3)
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A reaction:
Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief?
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3943
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If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Either you perceive the being of matter immediately, or mediately; if immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it; if mediately, let me know by what reasonings it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately.
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From:
George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.208)
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A reaction:
A problem for strong empiricists, and he is right that existence can't be directly perceived, but it seems a good explanation (for which some reason can be shown), and supports a more rationalist view.
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5192
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Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
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Full Idea:
Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents.
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From:
report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2
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A reaction:
This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database.
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5174
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Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The considerations which make it necessary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self.
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From:
comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.7
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A reaction:
Phenomenalism involves 'possible' experiences as well as actual ones. That could add up to quite a rich and stable account of the self, as opposed to Hume's notorious introspection, which only saw an actual shifting 'bundle' of experience.
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6403
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For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
Berkeley's thesis is that reality ultimately consists of a community of minds and their ideas; one of the minds (God) is infinite, and causes most of the ideas.
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From:
report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
I think Russell nicely pinpoints what is wrong with Berekely, which is that he confuses ideas with their contents. If I think about my garden, the garden is real (probably), which is the content, and they idea is just a way of thinking.
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3947
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Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Wood, fire, water, flesh, iron, are things that I know, and only known because I perceive them by my senses; these are immediately perceived, and so are ideas; ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence consists therefore in being perceived.
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From:
George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220)
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A reaction:
This makes no distinction between an idea and its content. Berkeley fails to grasp the weird concept of intentionality. Trees aren't in my head, just because I think about them!
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