display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
Full Idea: No proposition, other than a tautology, can possibly be anything more than a probable hypothesis. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A nice clear empiricist rejection of all attempts to assert necessary truths about nature. This also seems to be a rejection of empiricist foundationalism. A problem case seems to be introspective observations, which seem irrefutable and obvious. |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
Full Idea: Logical positivist phenomenalism has few supporters these days; ..no one ever seemed clear what the sense-datum equivalent of 'there is a table in the next room' could be. | |
From: comment on A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.4 | |
A reaction: But do the critics know what they mean by 'there is a table in the next room'? Does it just mean 'I am hoping there is'? You can't refer to the table in the next room without sticking your ontological neck out - and that is 'best explanation'. |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
Full Idea: The existence of a material thing is defined in terms of the actual and possible occurrence of the sense-contents which constitute it as a logical construction. | |
From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Obviously we need 'possible' experiences so that unperceived trees can still exist, but it is a can of worms. Is speculation about a possible world an account of possible experiences? Realists want to know WHY we think certain experiences are possible. |