display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
| Full Idea: The extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.06) | |
| A reaction: The point is that we may be unable to find the links which make the connections. Which implies that there are real connections waiting to be found. We could call this 'conceptual realism'. A job for philosophers! |
| 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
| Full Idea: When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.20.16) | |
| A reaction: Note that he is not just saying that we cannot resist believing what becomes evident to us, but he actually asserts that we cannot avoid 'knowing' it. This seems to imply that knowledge may be more basic than belief (as Williamson and Hossack argue). |
| 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
| Full Idea: A man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty, than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be; and that two ideas wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.02.01) | |
| A reaction: That leaves open the question of what you know when you know your ideas. Do you fully know the contents? The contingent truths expressed by some of them? Or just their meanings? |
| 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
| Full Idea: General certainty is never to be found but in our ideas. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.06.16) | |
| A reaction: This is a fairly standard empirical view of such things. The obvious opposition to it might be Moore's 'hand' example (Idea 6349), if we ask, which is more certain, this hand I hold up, or this complex proof in mathematics? |
| 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
| Full Idea: The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, thought it be no altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason, ..yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.11.03) | |
| A reaction: This is a clear instance of an acceptance of fallibilism. So one would hope, I think, from an orthodox empiricist philosopher, especially a representative realist like Locke, who as lots of areas where doubts can creep in. |
| 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
| Full Idea: If I know I doubt, I have as certain a perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.09.03) | |
| A reaction: The challenge to this Lockean assertion of the Cogito is what he means by a 'thing', and what grounds he has for asserting the existence of the 'thing', as opposed to some vague assertion about whatever makes doubting possible. |