20189
|
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
|
|
Full Idea:
Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not master.
|
|
From:
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appen p.2)
|
|
A reaction:
This is the opposite of Descartes' 'doxastic voluntarism' (i.e. we choose what to believe). If you want to become a Christian, steep yourself in religious literature, and the company of religious people. It will probably work.
|
6521
|
Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
One thing which is meant by saying that the phenomenal world represents or resembles the transcendental physical world is that the scientific laws devised to apply to the former, if correct, also apply (at least approximately) to the latter.
|
|
From:
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.3)
|
|
A reaction:
This is not, of course, an argument, or a claim which can be easily substantiated, but it does seem to be a nice statement of a central article of faith for representative realists. The laws of the phenomenal world are the only ones we are going to get.
|
6522
|
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is useful to identify three kinds of phenomenalism: theistic, sceptical and analytic; the first is represented by Berkeley, the second by Hume, and the third by most twentieth-century phenomenalists.
|
|
From:
Howard Robinson (Perception [1994], IX.4)
|
|
A reaction:
In Britain the third group is usually represented by A.J.Ayer. My simple objection to all phenomenalists is that they are intellectual cowards because they won't venture to give an explanation of the phenomena which confront them.
|