3943
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If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Either you perceive the being of matter immediately, or mediately; if immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it; if mediately, let me know by what reasonings it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately.
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From:
George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], II p.208)
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A reaction:
A problem for strong empiricists, and he is right that existence can't be directly perceived, but it seems a good explanation (for which some reason can be shown), and supports a more rationalist view.
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5192
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Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
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Full Idea:
Berkeley did not (as we are commonly told) deny the reality of material things. ..What Berkeley discovered was that material things must be defined in terms of sense-contents.
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From:
report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.2
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A reaction:
This seems to be a rather debatable attempt to claim that Berkeley was a phenomenalist (like Ayer), rather than an idealist. Try ideas 3942, 3944, 3945, 3957, 3959 in this database.
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5174
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Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The considerations which make it necessary, as Berkeley saw, to give a phenomenalist account of material things, make it necessary also, as Berkeley did not see, to give a phenomenalist account of the self.
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From:
comment on George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.7
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A reaction:
Phenomenalism involves 'possible' experiences as well as actual ones. That could add up to quite a rich and stable account of the self, as opposed to Hume's notorious introspection, which only saw an actual shifting 'bundle' of experience.
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6403
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For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
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Full Idea:
Berkeley's thesis is that reality ultimately consists of a community of minds and their ideas; one of the minds (God) is infinite, and causes most of the ideas.
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From:
report of George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
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A reaction:
I think Russell nicely pinpoints what is wrong with Berekely, which is that he confuses ideas with their contents. If I think about my garden, the garden is real (probably), which is the content, and they idea is just a way of thinking.
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3947
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Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Wood, fire, water, flesh, iron, are things that I know, and only known because I perceive them by my senses; these are immediately perceived, and so are ideas; ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence consists therefore in being perceived.
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From:
George Berkeley (Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous [1713], III p.220)
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A reaction:
This makes no distinction between an idea and its content. Berkeley fails to grasp the weird concept of intentionality. Trees aren't in my head, just because I think about them!
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23503
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Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.64)
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A reaction:
Despite this, Michael Morris is more inclined to see him as an idealist. It is not clear whether the present account of solipsism is idealist or realist. Berkeley seemed to think his idealism was true realism. Can reality be co-ordinated with a point?
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