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3 ideas
5806 | Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske] |
Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true. |
5801 | A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske] |
Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played. | |
From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief? |
9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |