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Ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Philosophical Letters' and 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'

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5 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
     Full Idea: Things which are susceptible to a rational account are knowable.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201d)
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: The most familiar epistemological theories are foundation theories, coherence theories, probabilistic theories, and reliabilist theories.
     From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], Pref)
     A reaction: A helpful list. Reliabilism is now the dominant externalist theory. Probability theories will centre on Bayes' Theorem (Idea 2798). The authors want an internalist theory that includes perceptions as well as beliefs. I currently favour coherence.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
     Full Idea: A man has passed from mere judgment to expert knowledge of the being of a wagon when he has done so in virtue of having gone over the whole by means of the elements.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 207c)
     A reaction: Plato is emphasising that the expert must know the hundred parts of a wagon, and not just the half dozen main components, but here the point is to go over the whole via the parts, and not just list the parts.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to believe something which is not the case.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 167a)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the object of a belief is what is not, the object of this belief is nothing; but if there is no object to a belief, then that is not belief at all.
     From: Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 189a)