display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Kant describes knowledge in terms of a 'threefold synthesis', in which something is first 'apprehended' as affecting the mind, then is 'reproduced' in the imagination, and finally is 'recognised' via a concept which classifies it. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 1 'Judgement' | |
| A reaction: Helpful. How does this distinguish knowledge from error (as Russell would enquire)? Is the 'apprehended', then, the unconceptualised 'Given'? I think that is what later German philosophers rebelled against in Kant. |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| Full Idea: All human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B730/A702) | |
| A reaction: 'Ideas' is a vague term. 'Propositions' might fit better. The question is whether concept-free intuitions are possible. They sound here like Humean 'impressions'. The brain phenomenon of re-entry suggests that ideas in turn influence intuitions. |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| Full Idea: Kant was the first to emphasize the distinction between understanding and reason in a definite way, establishing the finite and conditioned as the subject-matter of the former, and the infinite and unconditioned as that of the latter. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Georg W.F.Hegel - Logic (Encyclopedia I) §45 Add | |
| A reaction: This seems to match Plato's division of reality into the realm of experience and of the mind. I am inclined to see them as a unity, united by the many levels of abstraction. Frege is the modern spokesman for the Plato/Hegel view. |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: For Kant understanding essentially involves singular elements (and reason is essentially general). | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 3 |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| Full Idea: In the first part of our transcendental logic we defined the understanding as the faculty of rules; here we will distinguish reason from understanding by calling reason the faculty of principles. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B356/A299) | |
| A reaction: If we narrow the concept of rationality down to a concern with rules or principles, the concept of 'understanding' has to widen out to cover inferences from experience. Personally I think we can be rational about particulars as well as principles. |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| Full Idea: An 'opinion' is taking something to be true which is subjectively and objectively insufficient. 'Believing' is when it is subjectively sufficient and objectively insufficient. 'Knowing' is subjective and objective sufficiency (for myself, and everyone). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B850/A822) | |
| A reaction: He defines objectivity as being 'sufficient' for 'everyone'. Compare Aristotle's Idea 95. This implies a rather social criterion for knowledge, but doesn't deal with 'sufficient for a majority, but not everyone'. How high to set the bar? |