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4763
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'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
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Full Idea:
The 'evidentialists' (such as Locke and Hume) deny, and the 'voluntarists' (such as William James) affirm, that we ought to, or at least may, believe for other reasons than evidential epistemic reasons (e.g. for pragmatic reasons).
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From:
Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2)
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A reaction:
No need to be black-or-white here. Blatant evidence compels belief, but we may also come to believe by spotting a coherence, without additional evidence. We can also be in a state of trying to believe something. But see 4764.
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23175
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The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
Since the speculative reason is concerned chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], I-II Q94 4)
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A reaction:
This seems over-confident, and to confuse the facts with our knowledge of the facts. Simple arithmetic may seem certain, but long and intricate proofs are always a little uncertain.
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21337
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A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
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Full Idea:
Knowing beings are differentiated from non-knowing beings by this: non-knowing beings have only their own reality, but knowing beings are capable of possessing also the reality of something else, ...a presence of the thing known produced by this thing.
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From:
Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,q.Q14,art 1)
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A reaction:
[Quoted by Ryan Meade in a talk at Pigotts] A famous and much discussed remark. Aquinas was a direct realist about perception, so this presence seems to be the thing itself, rather than a 'representation'.
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