Combining Texts

Ideas for '', 'On What Grounds What' and 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism'

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2 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: The concept of knowledge is seriously problematic in more than one way, and is best avoided as far as possible in sober epistemological discussion.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 1.5)
     A reaction: Two sorts of states seem to be conflated: one where an animal has a true belief caused by an environmental event, and the other where a scholar pores over books and experiments to arrive at a hard-won truth. I say only the second is 'knowledge'.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: A 'Moorean certainty' is when something is more credible than any philosopher's argument to the contrary.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: The reference is to G.E. Moore's famous claim that the existence of his hand is more certain than standard sceptical arguments. It sounds empiricist, but they might be parallel rational truths, of basic logic or arithmetic.