Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues' and 'Fallibilism'
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7 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6940
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The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
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6941
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We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
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6942
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We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
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6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19701
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Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty]
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19700
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It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty]
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19702
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We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty]
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