Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Theory of Epistemic Rationality' and 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)'
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10 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
12544
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Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
6941
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We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
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6940
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The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
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6942
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We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
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6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
12574
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When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
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The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
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12562
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General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
12569
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Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
12564
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I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke]
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