Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Will to Believe' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'
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6 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
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19566
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Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
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6940
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The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
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6941
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We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
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6942
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We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
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6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
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19568
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Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
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