Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'works' and 'Problems of Philosophy'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

16 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
5412 Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
     Full Idea: When a certain number of logical principles have been admitted as self-evident, the rest can be deduced from them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as those that were assumed without proof.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
     A reaction: This seems an important corrective to the traditional rationalist dream, based on Euclid, that all knowledge is self-evident axioms followed by proofs of the rest. But Russell here endorses a more sensible sort of rationalism.
5413 Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
     Full Idea: Particular instances are more self-evident than general principles; for example, the law of contradiction is evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not as evident as that a particular rose cannot be both red and not red.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
     A reaction: This seems to true about nearly all reasoning, because whenever we are faced with a general principle for assessment, we check it by testing it against a series of particular instances, and try to think of contradictory particular counterexamples.
5415 As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
     Full Idea: It is clear from the case of memory that self-evidence has degrees, and is present in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible faintness.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
     A reaction: I am beginning to see Russell as the 'father of modern rationalism'. His relaxation of notions of an all-or-nothing a priori, and of a sharp distinction between axioms and proofs, lead to a sensible rationalism which even a Humean sceptic might buy.
5416 If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
     Full Idea: If propositions can have some degree of self-evidence without being true, we must say, where there is a conflict, that the more self-evident proposition is to be retained and the less self-evident rejected.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
     A reaction: This is a key part of Russell's 'moderate rationalism'. Presumably the rejected propositions were therefore not self-evident, and can be used as training for intuitions, by seeing why we got it wrong. Fools find absurd falsehoods self-evidently true.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
5397 The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the most important point of the controversy between empiricists and rationalist, the rationalists were right, since logical principles are known to us, but cannot be proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: Russell initially presents this as the answer to 'innate ideas'. I would prefer to say, in the style of Descartes, that logic is self-evident to the natural light of reason. The debate isn't over. A Turing machine may be able to do logic.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
4430 All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
     Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely.
5411 We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
     Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6514 Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: The weakest version of representationalism, found in Russell, asserts that there is no resemblance to reality on the level of secondary qualities, and also that primary qualities exhibit only a structural isomorphism.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.2
     A reaction: This seems a plausible thing to say about, say, shape, but it is not clear how the idea works for hardness or mass. The sense of touch seems to be much more directly in contact with actual primary qualities than visions does (let alone smell or hearing).
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6415 After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: During the decade after 'Problems of Philosophy' Russell points our repeatedly that specifications of sense-data come last in analysis, not first in experience.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This was a symptom of Russell losing faith in sense-data, and he eventually abandoned them. There is a possible position where we deny any such item as sense-data in a scientific account, but allow them in our metaphysics.
5358 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
     Full Idea: Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: This idea gradually became notorious, because it seems to create a new ontological category unnecessarily, and it creates problems, such as how the intermediary interacts with us and with things. Are sense-data totally non-conceptual?
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
7290 If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
     Full Idea: If Russell rejects innate ideas, and he even thinks the laws of thought must by triggered by experiences (e.g. of a beech tree), and he doesn't embrace associations, this implies that he thinks the mind begins as a tabula rasa.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by George Thompson - talk
     A reaction: This nice observation places Russell as (in my view) a rather old-fashioned empiricist, who ignores Hume and Kant, and is not willing to speculate about how the mind can turn acquaintances with sense-data into knowledge
5357 It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: Is experience the 'natural' place to begin? It didn't seem to strike Descartes that way. It seems better to say that philosophy begins when we are not quite satisfied with experience, and the natural place to begin is 'dissatisfaction'.
5382 We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
     Full Idea: We have acquaintance with outer senses, with inner sense (by introspection), with memory (of outer or inner sensations), with a Self (probably), and also with universals (general ideas).
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: The spectacular odd one out in a basic empiricist theory is, of course, universals, when one expects some sort of nominalist reduction of those into sense-data. I am very sympathetic to the Russell line, though it spells big ontological trouble.
5389 Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
     Full Idea: The chief importance of knowledge by descriptions is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5)
     A reaction: The most basic question for empiricism concerns how we can know things beyond immediate experience. Russell is right, though this doesn't tell us much. We need to know the rules for valid descriptions, explanation, speculations etc.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5376 I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
     Full Idea: There is no reason why I should not know of the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4)
     A reaction: This sort of realist claim (which he goes on to say results from inferences from descriptions) is needed to save empiricism from the absurdities of Berkeley and (dare I say it?) Quine. The Kantian Ego is a candidate.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
5414 Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
     Full Idea: An image cannot constitute a memory, because we notice that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
     A reaction: This sounds a bit glib, and maybe makes the mistake for which he criticises Berkeley, of confusing a thought and its content. The puzzle is how we know that some images represent the past, others the present, others predictions, and others fantasy.