display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Deliberation is not concerned with particular facts, such as 'is it a loaf?' or 'is it properly cooked?'; these are matters of sense-perception. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b33) | |
A reaction: This seems to be Aristotle's commitment to direct cognition through perception, though if pressed he might concede that concepts (such as 'cooked') are involved in perception. |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
22141 | It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b05), quoted by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
A reaction: This quotation is a sacred text for philosophers who place a high value on the consensus of thinking among the majority of people. I hate it when philosophers hijack an ordinary word and assign it a different meaning. |
95 | If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: What everyone believes is so. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173a01) | |
A reaction: Would you think me terribly unfashionable if I agreed with this? Huge numbers of people can be wrong, but if 'everyone' believes something it seems crazy to go against it. |
79 | Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Intuition apprehends the definitions which cannot be logically demonstrated. | |
From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1142a25) | |
A reaction: Nice to see that (like me) he has a positive view of intuition. I'm not sure how you would 'prove' a definition of the hidden nature of a thing (which is usually taken to be hidden). |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |