display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
| Full Idea: The limited theories of Berkeley and Hume have to be reductive, because they have to explain intentionality in terms of some kind of relation between sense-data; this predicament gives rise to the associationist accounts of psychology and meaning. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.4 | |
| A reaction: An illuminating explanation. Robinson seems to be implying that we should accept something like Searle's 'intrinsic' intentionality as basic, rather than intentionality built up from smaller components as Hume and Dennett suggest. |
| 543 | All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: By nature, all men long to understand [eidenai]; an indication is their delight in the senses. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980a21) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 8331 and Idea 12038 to understand what this means. I take it to support the thesis that the aim of philosophy is explanations (at a higher level of generality than the sciences). |
| 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
| Full Idea: Even Hume did not make empiricism so universal as to include mathematics in it. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Practical Reason Pref | |
| A reaction: Hume didn't actually exclude mathematics, and the notion of 'relations of ideas' is a pointer. Subsequent empiricist have offered promising accounts. Personally I like the idea that patterns are the key idea. |