display all the ideas for this combination of texts
9 ideas
11239 | The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of a priori truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11240. |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
Full Idea: If one took the numbers as primitive, one would not be deriving their existence and character from general principles- thus controverting Frege's view of the nature of an a priori subject. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority II | |
A reaction: He seems to be in tune with Leibniz on this. His view begs the obvious question of where the general principles come from. I would have thought that relationships between concepts might be known a priori, without principles being involved. |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
Full Idea: The mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgement is self-evidently correct, without enquiring into the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §90) | |
A reaction: Note the suggestion that there are two different sorts of self-evidence. But see Idea 1410. Frege presumably drifted into philosophy because he wasn't happy with this blissful ignorance. |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
Full Idea: If the proof of a truth can be derived exclusively from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03) | |
A reaction: Presumably the unproved general laws from which the derivation comes are more securely a priori, as are the principles used to make the derivation. As Frege says, he is trying to spell out Kant's view; see Idea 9345. |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
Full Idea: If it is possible to derive a proof purely from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 1 | |
A reaction: Burge brings out the contrast with Kant, for whom a priori truths are derived from particular facts, not general ones. |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
Full Idea: Frege challenged synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity, undertaken in order to provide a semantic basis for his logicist explanation of mathematical truth as analytic truth. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Jerrold J. Katz - Realistic Rationalism Int.xx |
23312 | Aristotle is a rationalist, but reason is slowly acquired through perception and experience [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is a rationalist …but reason for him is a disposition which we only acquire over time. Its acquisition is made possible primarily by perception and experience. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.173 | |
A reaction: I would describe this process as the gradual acquisition of the skill of objectivity, which needs the right knowledge and concepts to evaluate new experiences. |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Frege makes a notorious claim that what is intuitable is not communicable. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §26) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 4 |
16111 | Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: Since Aristotle generally prefers a metaphysical theory that accords with common intuitions, he frequently relies on facts about language to guide his metaphysical claims. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I approve of his procedure. I take intuition to be largely rational justifications too complex for us to enunciate fully, and language embodies folk intuitions in its concepts (especially if the concepts occur in many languages). |