Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Confessions', 'fragments/reports' and 'Problems of Knowledge'

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7 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: The point of insisting on the absolute immediacy of sense data is that representation always seems to involve the possibility of misrepresentation.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: Acquaintance with sense data is supposed to be a form of non-propositional knowledge, but how can something be non-propositional and yet knowledge?
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 8)
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
     Full Idea: I can distinguish the scent of lilies from that of violets, even though there is no scent at all in my nostrils.
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.08)
     A reaction: Augustine has a nice introspective account of how we experience memory, and identifies lots of puzzling features. I know I can identify the smell of vinegar, but I can't bring it to mind, the way I can the appearance of roses.
Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
     Full Idea: How can it be that my mind can be happy because of the joy that is in it, and yet my memory is not sad by reason of the sadness that is in it?
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14)
     A reaction: This seems to contradict his thought in Idea 22981, that memory and mind are the same. Recall seems to be a part of consciousness which is not fully wired up to the rest of the mind.
Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
     Full Idea: The mind and the memory are one and the same. We even call the memory the mind, for when we tell a person to remember something, we tell them to 'bear this in mind', and when we forget something 'it slipped out of my mind'.
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14)
     A reaction: This idea has become familiar in modern neuroscience, I think, presumably because we do not find distinct types of neurons for consciousness and for memory.
Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
     Full Idea: The memory contains the innumerable principles and laws of numbers and dimensions. None of these can have been conveyed to me by the bodily senses.
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.12)
     A reaction: Even if you have a fairly empirical view of the sources of mathematics (a view with which I sympathise), it must by admitted that our endless extrapolations from the sources also reside in memory. So we remember thoughts as well as experiences.
We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
     Full Idea: If we had to experience sorrow or fear every time that we mentioned these emotions, no one would be willing to speak of them.
     From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], X.14)
     A reaction: Remembering the death of a loved one can trigger fresh grief, but remembering their dangerous illness from which they recovered no longer contains the feeling of fear.