display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: If the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident to us, then its self-evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.1363), quoted by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4 | |
A reaction: Frege seems to have taken self-evidence as intrinsic justification, but Wittgenstein seems to demand a supporting inference. But what is it all based on? Stipulative definitions? |
23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
Full Idea: We can see the 'Tractatus' as an attempt to make sense of what is necessarily true of the world - in general, and not just in the mathematical case - without appealing to synthetic a priori truths. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2H | |
A reaction: Morris sees the Tractatus as firmly in the Kantian tradition, and exploring Kant's main project in the first Critique. |
23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.634) | |
A reaction: This is his rejection of Kant's dream, of inferring truths about the world by self-examination. However, compare Idea 23495. He clings to the faith that logic reveals 'something' about reality. |
7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Neither logical nor mathematical propositions say anything about the world, because in virtue of their always being true they are consistent with any way the world could happen to be. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This became the standard view for twentieth century empiricists, and appeared to rule out a priori synthetic knowledge forever. Kripke's proposal that there are a posteriori necessities, however, changes the picture. |
16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: That logic is a priori consists in the fact that we cannot think illogically. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.4731), quoted by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4 | |
A reaction: A rather startling claim. Presumably we have to say that when we draw a stupid inference, then we weren't really 'thinking'? |
23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: There are no pictures that are true a priori. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.225) | |
A reaction: This is part of the growing modern doubts about the scope or possibility of a priori knowledge. A 'picture' here is the mental model which is the meaning of a proposition. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |