Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Elements of Law' and 'works'

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3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us are those motions by which these seemings are caused.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.2.10), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.2
     A reaction: This seems to count as a sense-datum theory, rather than a representative theory of perception, since it makes no commitment to the qualities containing any accurate information at all. We just start from the qualities and try to work it out.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: All evidence is conception, as it is said, and all conception is imagination and proceeds from sense. And spirits we suppose to be those substances which work not upon the sense, and therefore not conceptible.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.11.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 16.2
     A reaction: This is exactly the same as Hume's claim that all ideas are the result of impressions, and is the very essence of empiricism. We see here that such an epistemology can have huge consequences.
Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Experience concludeth nothing universally.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640], I.4.10), quoted by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
     A reaction: Empiricists seem proud to claim this limitation on human understanding, where rationalists like Leibniz use it as an argument against empiricism. Kripke says (e.g. Idea 4966) they are both wrong! I sympathise with Kripke.