display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Once a thinker has acquired a perceptually individuated concept, his possession of that concept can causally influence what contents his experiences possess. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Like having 35 different words for 'snow', I suppose. I'm never convinced by such claims. Having the concepts may well influence what you look at or listen to, but I don't see the deliverances of the senses being changed by the concepts. |
12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: Perceptual experience has a second layer of nonconceptual representational content, distinct from immediate 'scenarios' and from conceptual contents. These additional contents I call 'protopropositions', containing an individual and a property/relation. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 3.3) | |
A reaction: When philosophers start writing this sort of thing, I want to turn to neuroscience and psychology. I suppose the philosopher's justification for this sort of speculation is epistemological, but I see no good coming of it. |