display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion. |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1) |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n) | |
A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation. |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3) |
7156 | Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All sensory perceptions are entirely suffused with value judgements (useful or harmful - consequently pleasant or unpleasant). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 02[95]) | |
A reaction: This seems like a wonderful anticipation of modern neuroscience findings about emotion. It is a nice challenge to Hume's 'impressions' and Russell's 'logical atoms'. But knowledge is power, and we can strip off the values from the perceptions. |
7181 | Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Intellectuality of pain: pain does not indicate what is momentarily damaged but what value the damage has with regard to the individual as a whole. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 07[48]) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but rather hard to substantiate. Boiling water on the back of a hand might be very painful, but not of huge consequence in terms of damage. The palm of the hand is much more important to us than the back. |
7129 | Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Sense-perception happens without our awareness: whatever we become conscious of is a perception that has already been processed. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 34[30]) | |
A reaction: This seems to me wonderfully perceptive for its date, and a crucial truth, because we have the delusion that we are our consciousness, whereas that is only a tiny part of what we are. |