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Ideas for 'The Discourses', 'Mathematics and the Metaphysicians' and '67: Platonic Questions'

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2 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: It is about the strongest proof one could offer of a proposition being evident, that even he who contradicts it finds himself having to make use of it.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.20.01)
     A reaction: Philosophers sometimes make fools of themselves by trying, by the use of elaborate sophistry, to demolish propositions which are self-evidently true. Don't be one of these philosophers!
Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell]
     Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78)
     A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere.