display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures. | |
From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63 |
20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
A reaction: I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'. |
20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
Full Idea: There are two forms of knowledge [gnomé], the one genuine, the other obscure. And to the obscure one belongs all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated from this one. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B011), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.139 | |
A reaction: [Sextus goes on to make it clear that the 'genuine' one is knowledge acquired by thought]. I take Parmenides to be the first rationalist. It is interesting that Democritus, who devoted his life to finding causal explanations, seems to be a rationalist. |
517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
Full Idea: Mind must never reject the senses, because that is where it gets its evidence, and it would be the mind's downfall. | |
From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B125), quoted by Galen - On Medical Experience 15.8 |
6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
Full Idea: The limited theories of Berkeley and Hume have to be reductive, because they have to explain intentionality in terms of some kind of relation between sense-data; this predicament gives rise to the associationist accounts of psychology and meaning. | |
From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.4 | |
A reaction: An illuminating explanation. Robinson seems to be implying that we should accept something like Searle's 'intrinsic' intentionality as basic, rather than intentionality built up from smaller components as Hume and Dennett suggest. |
6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
Full Idea: Even Hume did not make empiricism so universal as to include mathematics in it. | |
From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Practical Reason Pref | |
A reaction: Hume didn't actually exclude mathematics, and the notion of 'relations of ideas' is a pointer. Subsequent empiricist have offered promising accounts. Personally I like the idea that patterns are the key idea. |