display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
Full Idea: What non-experiential link to reality could support insights into its necessary character? | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: The key to it, I think, is your theory of mind. If you are a substance dualist, then connecting to such deep things looks fine, but if you are a reductive physicalist then it looks absurdly hopeful. |
19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
Full Idea: It is overwhelmingly plausible that some knowledge is empirical. The attractive thesis of naturalism is that all knowledge is; there is only one way of knowing. | |
From: Michael Devitt (There is No A Priori (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: How many ways for us to know seems to depend on what faculties we have. We lump our senses together under a single heading. The arrival of data is not the same as the arrival of knowledge. I'm unconvinced that naturalists like me must accept this. |
16720 | Secondary qualities come from temperaments and proportions of primary qualities [Conimbricense] |
Full Idea: Colors, flavours, smells, and other secondary qualities arise from the various temperaments and proportions of the primary qualities. | |
From: Collegium Conimbricense (Aristotelian commentaries [1595], I.10.4 Gen&C), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2 | |
A reaction: This is a bit more subtle than merely mixing the primary qualities. What about the powers of the primary qualities? Presumably that is the 'temperaments'? |