display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
Full Idea: Linguistic meaning is not rich enough to show either that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless or that all alleged synthetic a priori propositions are just analytic a priori propositions. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xx) |
7156 | Sense perceptions contain values (useful, so pleasant) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All sensory perceptions are entirely suffused with value judgements (useful or harmful - consequently pleasant or unpleasant). | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 02[95]) | |
A reaction: This seems like a wonderful anticipation of modern neuroscience findings about emotion. It is a nice challenge to Hume's 'impressions' and Russell's 'logical atoms'. But knowledge is power, and we can strip off the values from the perceptions. |
7181 | Pain shows the value of the damage, not what has been damaged [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Intellectuality of pain: pain does not indicate what is momentarily damaged but what value the damage has with regard to the individual as a whole. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 07[48]) | |
A reaction: An interesting claim, but rather hard to substantiate. Boiling water on the back of a hand might be very painful, but not of huge consequence in terms of damage. The palm of the hand is much more important to us than the back. |
7129 | Perception is unconscious, and we are only conscious of processed perceptions [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Sense-perception happens without our awareness: whatever we become conscious of is a perception that has already been processed. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 34[30]) | |
A reaction: This seems to me wonderfully perceptive for its date, and a crucial truth, because we have the delusion that we are our consciousness, whereas that is only a tiny part of what we are. |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
Full Idea: The Leibniz-Kant criticism of empiricism is that experience cannot teach us why mathematical and logical facts couldn't be otherwise than they are. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxxi) |