display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Linguistic meaning is not rich enough to show either that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless or that all alleged synthetic a priori propositions are just analytic a priori propositions. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xx) |
| 6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey). | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term. |
| 6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what? | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two. |
| 6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
| Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects. | |
| From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196) | |
| A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them? |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| Full Idea: The Leibniz-Kant criticism of empiricism is that experience cannot teach us why mathematical and logical facts couldn't be otherwise than they are. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxxi) |