Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics: the logical approach', 'Letter to Pythocles' and 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation'
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5 ideas
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
3306
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The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
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Full Idea:
One proves non-existence (e.g. of round squares) by using logic to derive a contradiction from the concept; it is precisely here, in such proofs, that we find the clearest example of a priori knowledge.
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From:
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch. 4)
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3349
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If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
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Full Idea:
Assume that we know to be true propositions of the form 'There are exactly x prime numbers between y and z', and synthetic a priori truths about Platonic objects are delivered to us on a silver platter.
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From:
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
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3341
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Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
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Full Idea:
Logical positivism has been concisely summarised as 'there is no synthetic a priori'.
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From:
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
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3344
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Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
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Full Idea:
No one thinks that the proposition that something exists that transcends all possible experience harbours a logical inconsistency. Its denial cannot therefore be an analytic proposition, so it must be synthetic, though only knowable on a priori grounds.
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From:
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
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3345
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Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
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Full Idea:
Appeals to intuition - no matter how informal - can hardly fail to smack of the synthetic a priori.
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From:
José A. Benardete (Metaphysics: the logical approach [1989], Ch.18)
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