6727
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Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
If heat and cold are only affections of the mind (since the same body seems cold to one hand and warm to the other), why may we not argue that figure and extension also appear different to the same eye at different stations?
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14)
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A reaction:
If the assessment of the qualities of an object is entirely a matter of our experiences of it, there is no denying Berkeley on this. However, judgement goes beyond experience, into speculations, inferences, and explanations.
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6728
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Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
Is it not reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §14)
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A reaction:
An intriguing argument, based on what is now the principle of slow-motion photography. Fast minds slow down movement, like great tennis players. By what right does Berkeley say that the external subject is unaltered?
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6720
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Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
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Full Idea:
The objects of knowledge are either ideas imprinted on the senses, or passions and operations of the mind, or ideas (formed by memory and imagination) compounding, dividing or barely representing the original perceptions.
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From:
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §1)
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A reaction:
This is the germ of Hume's 'associations' (Idea 2189). There is not much room here for synthetic a priori knowledge, as the a priori part seems to merely know the mind. Most of Russell's epistemology is contained in the last part of the sentence.
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