display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
Full Idea: 'Every event has a cause' and 'truth is correspondence to facts' are candidates for being synthetic a priori knowledge. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.2) |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion. |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1) |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n) | |
A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation. |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3) |