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Ideas for 'Thinking About Mathematics', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary'

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3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
     Full Idea: There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it should be expected that men should universally agree in them. And this is actually found to be the case with regard to many truths, against which we find no dissent.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2)
     A reaction: He says that a few sceptical philosophers may disagree. This is a nice statement of his creed of common sense. I agree with him, and Aristotle observes the same fact.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
     Full Idea: Crude rationalists postulate a special knowledge-generating faculty of rational intuition. Crude empiricists regard intuition as an obscurantist term of folk psychology. Linguistic/conceptual philosophy says it reveals linguistic or conceptual competence.
     From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: Kripke seems to think that it is the basis of logical competence. I would use it as a blank term for any insight in which we have considerable confidence, and yet are unable to articulate its basis; roughly, for rational thought that evades logic.
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
     Full Idea: 'Intuition' plays a major role in contemporary analytic philosophy's self-understanding. ...When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they appeal to intuitions. ...Thus intuitions are presented as our evidence in philosophy.
     From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], p.214-5), quoted by Herman Cappelen - Philosophy without Intuitions 01.1
     A reaction: Williamson says we must investigate this 'scandal', but Cappelen's book says analytic philosophy does not rely on intuition.